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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CHAMBERLIN:

1. Reference your memorandum of 8 January 1947, subject: CIG 19 which reads:

"1. Approval of CIG 19 was originally given subject to the approval of the collection plan drawn up for its implementation.

"2. CIG 19 and its accompanying plan for collection were accepted as an experiment in the coordination of the collection of intelligence—[] being selected as the field for the experiment. This action was taken with the hope that it might lead to a solution of the fundamental problems of the coordination of all collection activities and the delineation of intelligence responsibilities, although it was recognized that it and its counterpart, the CIG plan, was more limited in scope than, and somewhat contrary to, War Department doctrines which are global in nature.

"3. Since CIG 19 was initiated, NIA Directive No. 7 has been published, coordinating the entire field of collection activities. CIG 23, too, (which coordinates the responsibilities for the production of intelligence) is now in circulation and apparently its approval is in sight. When approved, CIG 23, together with NIA Directive No. 7, would appear to obviate the desirability of the China experiment.

"4. In view of the publication of NIA Directive No. 7 and the impending publication of the Enclosure to CIG 23, it is recommended that CIG 19 and its accompanying collection plan be withdrawn from the consideration of the Intelligence Advisory Board or at least postponed for consideration to insure that it be brought into full consonance with the broader directives."

2. Your proposal that CIG discontinue the preparation of NIR indicates a misunderstanding of the National Intelligence Program as it has been developed by CIG with the advice and assistance of representatives of the IAB agencies. I therefore believe it advisable to explain this program in some detail so that you will realize the part to be played by National Intelligence Requirements and their absolute necessity to the DCI in his mission as well as their expected usefulness to the several agencies.

3. In its efforts to comply with the mission assigned to it by the President's letter of 22 January 1946 as interpreted in part by subsequent NIA directives, the CIG under my direction has attempted to develop plans "to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security." These plans

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have all fallen under the three general heads of:

1. collection
2. research or production
3. dissemination

Those several segregated problems which have been referred by the agencies to CIG for coordination (see TAB A) have also been studied in the light of these three basic categories.

4. Interwoven in these three basic categories are the following types of intelligence which are integral parts of the national intelligence mission:

- a. combat or operational intelligence
- b. staff intelligence
- c. strategic intelligence

a. Combat or operational Intelligence is the responsibility of the theater commander in the military sphere and of the chief of mission in the diplomatic sphere. It is used by these individuals on a rapid basis of day to day activities and is not subject to the benefit of expert researching.

The speed of present day communications currently permits parent agency support groups also to use this intelligence in its unevaluated form.

The interest of CIG in combat or operational intelligence is that it becomes promptly and concurrently available for that broader correlation, evaluation, and analysis employed for the production of both staff and strategic intelligence.

b. Staff Intelligence is that intelligence required for the conduct of the operations of each of the several departments of the Government. It must be prepared by the intelligence branch of the appropriate department to meet its own needs. It may include current and researched intelligence. CIG's interest in staff intelligence is set forth in NIA No. 5, paragraph _____. CIG is also responsible to see that procedures are in operation

which will insure the receipt by each agency of that intelligence

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information and staff intelligence originating in another agency which is necessary to the first agency in its development of its staff intelligence.

c. Strategic Intelligence is that intelligence which results from a careful correlation, evaluation, and analysis of all available intelligence information and staff intelligence, for the use of the President and top policy officers of the Government in developing policies for the protection of the national security. CIG's interest in strategic intelligence is paramount since CIG alone is authorized to produce it. The DCI must therefore determine the collection requirements and procedures, the research requirements and procedures, and the dissemination requirements and procedures.

5. In developing its plans for the coordination of the three basic phases of intelligence work, CIG has attempted and sincerely believes that it has given careful consideration to the requirements of the several agencies as well as to its own requirements. Every effort has been made to create an appreciation by the agencies of their interdependability and the logic of closer cooperation.

6. One of the forces behind the original creation of a central intelligence organization was the sad result of former agency jealousies and distrusts which resulted in a compartmentalism which was not in the best interests of the national intelligence mission. Another such force was the duplication in some fields and the omission in others. A third was the lack of some central point where the intelligence of the three departments (State-War-Navy) could be correlated objectively and free from departmental pressures, and evaluated as a whole.

7. A Collection Plan can provide for all collection activities and procedures whether they are for the collection of ~~national~~ material for combat (operational), staff, or strategic intelligence. But to be a continuing plan not requiring frequent change it cannot contain directives as to what intelligence material to collect. At most it

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can allocate broad fields to specialized collectors. Even here provisions must be made for ad hoc reallocation on special occasions. The mass of intelligence material available to efficient collectors is such that selection must be made. That selection can be made only by those having the perspective of distance and a knowledge of the policy or operational officers' demands for estimates. This the NIR is intended to do. By consultation with the agencies the NIR ~~is~~ will in so far as possible include in order of their relative importance the intelligence requirements of the several agencies and of CIG. (footnote: NIR will also serve as guidance for the general activities of Special Operations.) The absence of NIR will cause the issuance of a multitude of collection requests from CIG to insure the receipt of intelligence information needed by the DCI in the preparation of strategic and national policy intelligence. Their absence will also leave the coordinators designated by NIA 7 without the guidance they must have for the implementation of that plan. I therefore believe in the necessity of their prompt issuance for the strategic areas of the world and shall take such steps as may be necessary to that end. It is my understanding that other intelligence agencies represented in IAB concur in this opinion.

8. The Production Plan is a natural companion of the Collection Plan. Without that coordination which establishes sound and sure agency interdependability, each agency must operate as a self-contained unit performing by and for itself all of the collection and production procedures. Allocation in one field requires concurrent allocation in the other. Every intelligence field is a specialized field and each such field should be in the hands of the best specialists available. Therefore if the collection of political, cultural, and sociological intelligence is allocated to the department specializing in this field, the preliminary evaluation of the material and the preparation of basic estimates should rest with similar experts. This does not preclude the procedure whereby these basic

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estimates will be further treated by all the agencies in the preparation of their staff intelligence. But the mere possession of intelligence in no matter what form is not an end in itself. There must therefore be a dissemination procedure.

9. The Dissemination Plan must insure the rapid dissemination of all incoming intelligence information to those agencies that may require it in that form. It should equally discontinue the dissemination of intelligence material which is not wanted and which only confuses by its oppressive volume.

10. In addition it should insure the dissemination of basic estimates required for the development of staff intelligence. And finally it should insure the receipt by CIG of all staff intelligence so that proper strategic and national policy intelligence may be prepared by the DCI for the President.

11. It is entirely within the realm of possibility that from time to time the intelligence requirements of the several agencies for their own staff intelligence purpose would not produce the intelligence necessary for the preparation of strategic and national policy intelligence. Therefore there must be provision whereby the DCI can specify his intelligence requirements. This opportunity is afforded by the NIR.

12. I therefore request that you issue such directives as may be necessary to the individuals already designated by you to assist the CIG in preparing NIR on the USSR and the Middle East. Invitations for interagency meetings to prepare these NIR will be issued in the next few days.

13. I also request that you give your concurrence to the immediate issuance [] As you are aware the preparation of NIR China was initiated on 30 August 1946 with the idea that they would be revised quarterly. The [] were approved by the IAB on November 7, 1946 and the subsequent inexcusable delay has been the result of consideration of the implementing directive.

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